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I. INTRODUCTION
In a previous article, I argued that, properly understood, tex-
tualism implements a special form of the nondelegation doctrine,
one that prohibits legislative self-delegation.' If the judiciary ac-
cepts certain types of legislative history (committee reports and
sponsors' statements) as "authoritative" evidence of legislative in-
tent in cases of ambiguity, then the particular legislators who write
that history (the committees and sponsors) effectively settle statu-
tory meaning for Congress as a whole. 2 Against the background of
* Michael I. Sovern Professor of Law, Columbia University. I thank Brad Clark, Michael
Dorf, Sam Issacharoff, William Kelley, Debra Livingston, Henry Monaghan, and Peter Strauss
for valuable comments.
1. See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
706-25 (1997).
2. Legislative history may be considered "authoritative" when courts use it to settle
meaning while simultaneously attributing its authority to the identity of its source (for example,
a committee report or sponsor's statement). See id. at 681-84. As I have explained elsewhere,
self-delegation concerns arise when courts treat legislative history as "authoritative" in that
sense. See id. at 731. I have also suggested, however, that this conclusion may leave some room
for courts to consult 'legislative history that does not just declare congressional intent, but that
supplies an objective, unmanufactured history of a statute's context." Id. If such legislative
history persuasively describes that objective context (rather than merely offering the committee's
or sponsor's own idiosyncratic expression of intent), a court may consider that history for " 'the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with ear-
lier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
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such a judicially fashioned interpretive practice,3 when Congress
passes a vague or ambiguous statute, it thereby implicitly delegates
its law-elaboration authority to legislative agents, who effectively
fashion the details of meaning outside the enacted text.4 As a re-
sult, rank-and-file members of the majority can vote for the statute
without having to vote (and thereby assume responsibility) for the
details authoritatively elaborated by their agents.5 Much existing
Supreme Court case law suggests precisely this result.6 But I find it
problematic.
In particular, I have argued that the Court's separation-of-
powers case law powerfully undermines any approach to legislative
history that generally treats it as authoritative. 7 Although the
Court routinely sustains legislative delegations of law-elaboration
authority to other branches,8 it has strictly barred Congress from
delegating such authority to its own agents, noting that self-
delegation poses too great a threat to the constitutionally pre-
scribed process of bicameralism and presentment.9 The reason is
power to control. " Id. at 732, 733 n.252 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
3. With the rise of textualism near the end of the twentieth century, this practice seems to
have become far less common. See, e.g., Hans Baade, Time and Meaning: Notes on the Intertem-
poral Law of Statutory Construction and Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 319, 324
(1995); Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline of Legislative History: Has Someone Heard a Voice
Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 PUB. INT. L. REV. 57, 58.
4. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent- The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory In-
terpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 23-24 (1994) (arguing that committee chairs and
floor managers explain a bill's intent or purpose as "appointed agent[s] of the majority that
passed the chamber's version of the statute"); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme
Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306 (1990) ('[To the extent that Congress performs its responsi-
bilities through committees and delegates to the staff the writing of its reports, it is Congress'[s]
evident intention that an explanation of what it has done be obtained from these extrinsic mate-
rials.").
5. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 101 (1981) (holding that "[a]ny doubt as to the
intent of Congress was removed by the House Report'); J.W. Bateson Co. v. United States ex rel.
Bd. of Trustees of the Natl Automatic Sprinkler Indus. Pension Fund, 434 U.S. 586, 591 (1978)
(noting that "the authoritative Committee Reports .. . squarely focus on the question" and
"leave[] no room for doubt about Congress'[s] inten").
7. As noted below, Congress could, of course, actually vote to adopt some aspect of the leg-
islative history as authoritative. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
9. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 274-75 (1991) (holding that individual Members of Congress may not serve on
a tribunal that exercises delegated power); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726-27 (1986) (hold-
ing that Congress may not reserve power to remove an officer who exercises delegated lawmak-
ing authority); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983) (invalidating one-House legislative
veto).
1530
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this: when Congress enacts a vague statute and leaves it to an
agency or court to fill in the details, it consciously cedes potentially
significant policymaking discretion to a different branch of govern-
ment. 10 This fact provides a built-in structural incentive for Con-
gress itself to specify important federal statutory policy." If, how-
ever, Congress can delegate law-elaboration authority to its own
agents (committees or bill sponsors), that structural incentive is
lost, and the constitutional values embodied in the process of bi-
cameralism and presentment are more readily compromised.
12
Hence, the Court has made clear that Congress as a whole must
either formulate the statutory details itself (through the procedures
prescribed by Article I, Section 7) or assign law-elaboration author-
ity to a separate governmental branch. 13 Under these premises, ju-
dicial treatment of legislative history as authoritative is problem-
atic precisely because it enables Congress to engage in constitu-
tionally prohibited self-delegation. 14
10. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (noting that it is
"entirely appropriate" for the executive to resolve policy questions that "Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute").
11. This premise had a long pre-constitutional tradition in the political theory underlying
the separation of powers. For example, influential theorists such as Montesquieu and Black-
stone had argued that the separation of lawmaking from law-elaboration would give the law-
maker an important incentive not to enact vague laws. See John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
612, 647-48 (1996).
This structural incentive is particularly important because, from the very beginning, the
Court has consistently expressed doubt about its own capacity to enforce the nondelegation prin-
ciple directly. See, e.g., Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825) ("The difference
between the departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and
the judiciary construes the law; but the maker of the law may commit something to the discre-
tion of the other departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of delicate and
difficult inquiry, into which a Court will not enter unnecessarily.") (Marshall, C.J.); Manning,
supra note 1, at 727; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 326-28
(2000).
12. As Justice Stevens once put it:
If Congress were free to delegate its policymaking authority to one of its components,
or to one of its agents, it would be able to evade "the carefully crafted restraints spelled
out in the Constitution." That danger- congressional action that evades constitutional
restraints-is not present when Congress delegates lawmaking power to the executive
or to an independent agency.
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 755 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 959); see also Peter L. Strauss & Andrew R. Rutten, The Game of Politics and Law: A Re-
sponse to Eskridge and Ferejohn, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 207 (1992) (arguing that the legisla-
tive veto would "encourage less precise and less frequent legislation by depriving Congress of
motivation to solve its substantial communications problems at the time of enactment').
13. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 272.
14. See Manning, supra note 1, at 710-25.
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In a characteristically thoughtful article published in this
volume, Professor Jonathan Siegel challenges the applicability of
the general constitutional rule against legislative self-delegation to
judicial reliance on legislative history to fix statutory meaning. 15
Although acknowledging the importance of that structural norm (as
well as carefully elaborating some of its important implications), 16
Professor Siegel questions whether the judicial use of most legisla-
tive history implicates that norm at all. His argument rests upon
three premises. First, Congress can validly incorporate pre-existing
materials by reference. 17 Such action is not a form of "delegation"
because Congress, in effect, votes for the existing materials when it
votes for the statute. 8 Second, Congress can and does pass inter-
pretation acts prescribing generic rules of construction to govern
future enactments. 19 Third, and of most interest here, Congress
could find "a fairly easy escape" from self-delegation concerns by
passing what Siegel calls the "Interpretation of Statutes Act of
2000."20 This hypothetical act would prescribe a generic rule of con-
struction consisting of two parts: (1) it would provide that the leg-
islative history of every future statute is automatically incorporated
by reference (without express adoption); and (2) it would instruct
courts to "give such weight to the [incorporated] legislative history
... as was customarily given to legislative history by federal courts
in the period from 1900 to 1980."21 Siegel argues that this arrange-
ment would eliminate self-delegation concerns because every vote
for a future statute would, by operation of standing law, be a vote
for its legislative history-or, more precisely, a vote directing courts
to use that statute's legislative history in an authoritative manner.
If such an Interpretation of Statutes Act could eliminate self-
15. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1457 (2000).
16. See id. at 1462-70. For example, Professor Siegel notes that the norm against self-
delegation applies with particular force to post-enactment legislative history. See id. at 1523.
17. See id. at 1480-89.
18. See id. at 1480.
19. See id. at 1490 n.181, 1502-03 (noting, however, that Congress only "rarely adopts leg-
islation containing general instructions for the interpretation of statutes"); see also, e.g., 1 U.S.C.
§ 109 (1994) CThe repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any
penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so
expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of
sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or
liability."); infra note 24 and accompanying text.
20. Siegel, supra note 15, at 1498; see also id. at 1489-1509.
21. Id. at 1500.
1532 [Vol. 53:5
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delegation concerns about legislative history, Siegel argues, those
concerns must not be constitutionally grounded. 22
II. CODIFYING LEGISLATIVE SELF-DELEGATION
Given page constraints, this brief reply offers only prelimi-
nary observations about Professor Siegel's proposed solution to an
old problem. If, as I have argued, judicial reliance on legislative his-
tory as an authoritative source of meaning permits an implicit-
and impermissible-self-delegation of lawmaking power to legisla-
tive agents, then Siegel's proposed statute would simply formalize
an unconstitutional arrangement. In fact, it would make matters
worse. It would place Congress's express imprimatur on an ar-
rangement that aggrandizes its own power to make law outside the
explicit process mandated by Article I, Section 7. Further reflection
indeed shows that Siegel's novel proposal does not mitigate the self-
delegation problem.
A. A "Rule of Construction?"
Professor Siegel principally contends that his proposed ge-
neric "rule of construction" eliminates the self-delegation problem
for the following reason: because the proposed statute directs courts
to treat the legislative history as if it had been expressly incorpo-
rated by reference (and to give it its customary weight), the statute
would constructively subject the legislative history to the required
legislative process. The serious structural concerns raised by
treating legislative history as authoritative, however, can scarcely
be cured by such a "rule of construction." While one can fully as-
sume, and I certainly do, that Congress has the power both to pre-
scribe generic rules of construction and to incorporate existing ma-
terials by reference, Siegel's proposed statute, in reality, is not di-
rected to either purpose. It does no more and no less than instruct
courts to give legal effect to materials produced by legislative sub-
units, while at the same time relieving rank-and-file members of
any direct responsibility to vote for or against those extra-statutory
materials.
To sharpen the point, consider how Siegel's proposal differs
from traditional generic rules of construction. Such rules might tell
the judiciary how to understand certain commonly used words or
phrases when they appear in federal statutes (e.g., "words import-
22. See id. at 1460-61.
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ing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or
things; words importing the plural include the singular"). 23 Or they
might inform the courts how to decipher frequently recurring situa-
tions in federal statute law (e.g., "[w]henever an Act is repealed,
which repealed a former Act, such former Act shall not thereby be
revived, unless it shall be expressly so provided."). 24 Or, while more
unusual, generic rules might even refer, for convenience, to a fixed
and pre-existing external source, universally incorporating it by
reference into all relevant statutes (e.g., "common law terms shall
be understood in the sense recorded in the fifth edition of Black's
Law Dictionary"). But Professor Siegel's proposed statute does not
seek to adopt a fixed, external reference point for understanding
oft-used words and phrases or recurring statutory scenarios; it sim-
ply is not about interpretation in that sense. Instead, it is explicitly
and exclusively about reallocating lawmaking power from Congress
to its legislative sub-units each and every time Congress passes a
statute. Clothing a self-consciously structural objective in the garb
of a rule of construction cannot alter that reality.
Indeed, to understand how Professor Siegel's generic incorpo-
ration-by-reference rule seeks to reallocate power, it is helpful to
consider precisely what such a rule would accomplish. Under ex-
isting law, Congress already can incorporate by reference existing
materials outside the statutory text, and it could include in any (or
every) statute a provision stating that the legislative history, or
some specified part of it (such as a Senate Report or a particular
floor statement), "is hereby incorporated by reference for purposes
of clarifying ambiguity." In fact, Congress has occasionally adopted
the legislative history of a statute explicitly. Examples of this, how-
ever, are conspicuous precisely because they are so rare and because
they tend to reflect a careful choice about which legislative history
to include. 25 Perhaps that is because when Congress adopts or in-
23. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
24. 1 U.S.C. § 108 (1994).
25. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 92 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
that Congress adopted certain legislative findings by enacting conference report); Roland Elec.
Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 668-69 n.5 (1946) (observing that Congress enacted conference
reports accompanying Fair Labor Standards Act); ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Starr, J., dissenting in part) (indicating that, in the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Congress chose "to speak to the precise issue at hand through a Committee Report that
was expressly adopted by both Houses"). Perhaps the most famous example involves Section
105(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which provides:
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137
Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered leg-
islative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing
1534 [Vol. 53:5
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corporates legislative history in a particular statute, its members
must actually vote for or against the specific materials designated.
Given the careful process that generates final statutory texts (in-
cluding committee mark-up, floor amendment, and confereice rec-
onciliation), it would be somewhat odd if legislators decided simply
to vote into law, without similar scrutiny, everything else generated
by the legislative process as well.
If Professor Siegel correctly assumes that his generic incorpo-
ration-by-reference statute is functionally equivalent to explicit
statute-by-statute incorporation, 26 then his proposal is, in fact, un-
necessary.2 7 Congress can already do that whenever and on what-
ever terms it desires. If, however, Siegel's proposed statute is at-
tractive because it systematically dilutes rank-and-file legislators'
responsibility for the legislative history thus "incorporated," then
his proposal is susceptible to the same objection I previously lodged
against judicial reliance on legislative history as authoritative.
That is, it effectively permits those legislators to shift authoritative
law-elaboration to the specific legislative agents who generate the
legislative history.
B. The Separation-of-Powers Case Law
Professor Siegel further contends that because his proposed
statute gives effect to pre-enactment legislative history, it does not
even implicate the Court's case law condemning legislative self-
or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove-Business ne-
cessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (1994). The "official" legislative history, in turn, states as follows:
INTERPRETIVE MEMORANDUM
The final compromise on S.1745 agreed to by several Senate sponsors, including
Senators DANFORTH, KENNEDY, and DOLE, and the Administration states
that with respect to Wards Cove-Business necessity/cumulation/alternative
business practice-the exclusive legislative history is as follows:
The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are intended to reflect the con-
cepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
137 CONG. REc. S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Danforth).
26. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 1490-97.
27. It should be acknowledged that Professor Siegel states that his statute "is not offered as
a proposal that Congress should adopt, nor as a prediction of anything Congress is likely to
)trerdai"srr kit sdewi imporuAn ' i nt'con Tae consUtmt6nai'piinatifnos -o ffai't;
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delegation.28 The relevant cases, he contends, reject legislative self-
delegation of post-enactment authority to prescribe law outside the
constitutionally prescribed procedures. 29 Siegel does accurately
identify a distinction between his proposed statute and those at is-
sue in the Court's cases.30 Contrary to his argument, however, that
distinction does not relate to the reasoning of those cases. That rea-
soning says nothing about the timing of the lawmaking at issue, but
speaks directly to the problem of lawmaking without adherence to
the proper procedures. Hence, in condemning self-delegation, the
Court has emphasized that " 'when [Congress] exercises its legisla-
tive power, it must follow the 'single, finely wrought and exhaus-
tively considered, procedures' specified in Article 1."31 If, however, a
statute authorizes " 'a congressional agent to set policy that binds
the Nation,' " that arrangement risks evasion of those constitution-
ally mandated procedures. 32 This concern, moreover, assumes added
significance because congressional powers are " 'at once more ex-
tensive and less susceptible of precise limits,' " and because Con-
gress can easily" 'mask under complicated and indirect measures'"
any attempt to transgress constitutional limits. 3 Accordingly, the
entire point of prohibiting self-delegation is to deny Congress the
28. See id. at 1492 ("[lit is easy to see the hypothetical Interpretation of Statutes Act not
only does not violate the nondelegation doctrine, but does not even implicate that doctrine at
all.").
29. See id. (It is no accident that Chadha, Bowsher, and the other cases developing and ap-
plying the rule against congressional self-delegation are all cases about delegation of power to
take future acts that have legal force.").
30. The facts of the relevant cases are as follows: in Chadha, the Court invalidated a one-
House veto of the Attorney General's exercise of delegated power to suspend a deportation. INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983). In so holding, the Court made clear that Congress can
delegate broad authority to administrative agencies to implement administrative schemes, but it
cannot reserve any of that power for its own components. See id. at 953 n.16. In Bowsher,
moreover, the Court held that Congress could not authorize the Comptroller General, in effect, to
reduce the budget deficit pursuant to a formula prescribed by the Gramm-Rudman Hollings Act.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986). What was fatal, the Court emphasized, was that
Congress possessed statutory power to remove the Comptroller for "actual or perceived trans-
gressions of the legislative will." Id. at 729. Hence, Congress could not assign its own agent the
power to implement a federal statutory scheme. Finally, in Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth.,
the Court invalidated a statute establishing a Board of Review for National and Dulles Airports,
which included nine Members of Congress acting in their "individual capacities, as representa-
tives of users" of the metropolitan Washington airports. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 267, 271-74 (1991) (construing
49 U.S.C. App. § 2456(f(1) (1986)). The Court explained that no federal legislator can partici-
pate in the administration of an act of Congress, even if it involves a de minimis exercise of fed-
eral power. See id. at 271-77.
31. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 501 U.S. at 274 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951).
32. Id. at 274 n.19 (quoting Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 758-59 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
33. Id. at 274 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison)).
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power "to evade the 'carefully crafted' constraints of the Constitu-
tion."3 4
Professor Siegel's proposal directly implicates these constitu-
tional concerns. And the fact that the legislative history exists be-
fore the statute's enactment does not alleviate them. Rather, that
fact exacerbates such concerns by highlighting that such materials
could have been, but were not, enacted along with the statute. Al-
though the legislative history comes into being prior to the enact-
ment, a vote for the statute (despite Siegel's proposal) does not
amount to vote for the legislative history. In fact, by codifying cus-
tomary interpretive practice, his proposal would ensure that rank-
and-file legislators need never take responsibility for that history.3 5
The Court traditionally has relied on the legislative history when a
statute is ambiguous. 36 But no algorithm exists for such a determi-
nation,3 7 and many factors (text, structure, etc.) may bear on
whether a statute is clear without regard to the legislative history.
Individual legislators may understand the text differently from the
representations in the legislative history and, more importantly,
they may express a plausible public disagreement with a commit-
tee's or a sponsor's views on the bill. Indeed, because traditional
practice treats committee reports and sponsors' statements as more
"authoritative" than rank-and-file floor statements, individual leg-
islators can even take to the floor to disavow the committee's or
sponsor's interpretation, without precluding judicial reliance on the
views of those more "authoritative" actors.38 Hence, even if commit-
tee reports and sponsors' statements have dispositive force, rank-
and-file members avoid meaningful responsibility for those materi-
34. Id. at 269 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959).
35. The following discussion builds on Manning, supra note 1, at 720-21.
36. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994) ('[Wle do not resort to
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear."); United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (emphasizing that courts must respect a statute's "plain meaning").
37. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 62 (1988).
38. See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 229-30 (1997) (disregarding individual Sena-
toer's floor statement in favor of contrary expression in Senate Report); United States v. Wright-
wood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942) (disregarding floor debates in favor of exposition in
committee report); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 90 (1914) (same); see also North Haven Bd.
of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) (discounting interpretive value of floor statements
by rank-and-file legislators); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) (same); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Buckley, J.,
concurring) (noting that legislators use floor statements "to reach beyond Capitol Hill to audi-
ences ranging from lobbyists who may help a beleaguered legislator achieve his goals, to home
state journalists on whose reports the next election may well depend").
2000] 1537
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als.89 This separates responsibility from result, defeating the spe-
cial accountability that comes from requiring both Houses to pass
authoritative texts and then to submit them to the President for
approval or veto.4° That concern does not vanish simply because
Congress enacts a statute that tells the courts to keep doing what
they (by Siegel's account) customarily did with legislative history.
Quite to the contrary; by converting an implicit delegation, built on
an unfocussed and unanalyzed judicial practice, into the explicit
product of a legislative command, Siegel simply intensifies the
problems I have described.
C. Preserving the Aims of Bicameralism and Presentment
Finally, Professor Siegel dismisses my general concern about
legislative responsibility as a "practical" argument, apparently im-
plying that, as such, it lacks constitutional relevance.41 Here too, I
believe he is in error. At bottom, his criticism fails to acknowledge
that bicameralism and presentment serve important constitutional
interests, which the Court's non-self-delegation jurisprudence seeks
to protect. 42 While this brief reply is not the occasion for detailed
39. Indeed, Professor Vermeule has argued that modern legislative history is voluminous
and heterogeneous in its interpretive authority; hence, such history may be costly and difficult to
disentangle with accuracy, particularly in relation to the statutory text. See Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity
Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1867-77 (1998). This complexity may make it harder to hold
legislators accountable for policy details found in the legislative history rather than the text.
That same problem remains under Professor Siegel's proposed statute, which incorporates the
legislative history wholesale into every statute under the customary rules of interpretation. Of
course, if Congress specifically incorporates the entire legislative history by reference on a stat-
ute-by-statute basis (something I have treated as valid), the problem of volume would persist. As
previously discussed, however, it is unlikely that an act of specific, statute-by-statute incorpora-
tion would often result in the incorporation of the entire legislative history; the enhanced ac-
countability that comes with specific incorporation should induce the legislature to pick and
choose which legislative history to embrace. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-49 (1983) ('By providing that no law could take ef-
fect without the concurrence of the prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the
Framers reemphasized their belief... that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been
carefully and fully considered by the Nation's elected officials.").
41. See Siegel, supra note 15, at 1509.
42. For example, in condemning a one-House legislative veto of the executive's exercise of
delegated authority, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the purposes served by an insis-
tence upon legislative action through bicameralism and presentment. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at
946-51. The Court thus explained:
[Tihe Framers were acutely conscious that the bicameral requirement and the
Presentment Clauses would serve essential constitutional functions. The Presi-
dent's participation in the legislative process was to protect the Executive
Branch from Congress and to protect the whole people from improvident laws.
The division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legisla-
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consideration of the purposes of bicameralism and presentment,43 it
suffices to examine one respect in which "practical" concerns about
legislator responsibility implicate the relevant constitutional inter-
ests. The constitutional objective of controlling "factions" (or, as we
would put it, "interest groups") is manifest in the design of the leg-
islative power. 4 Bicameralism and presentment divide the legisla-
tive power among three relatively independent institutions, in sig-
nificant part, to make it harder for any faction to capture the leg-
islative process and use it to the detriment of the public interest.
That, at least, was the original understanding.45
tive power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate
in separate settings .... It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative
action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision that the legislative
power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure.
Id. at 951.
43. For further discussion of those purposes, see Manning, supra note 11, at 649-50.
44. See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950 (noting that bicameralism addressed the "fear that
special interests could be favored at the expense of public needs"); Mark Movesessian, Are Stat-
utes Really 'Eegislative Bargains"? The Failure of the Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1183 (1998) C'[B]y acting to disperse legislative power among diverse
actors with conflicting interests, they help prevent any one 'faction' from capturing government
and threatening 'the liberty and security of the governed'. "); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of
the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1249
(1989) CThe Framers created two antidotes to factionalism in Congress: bicameralism and pre-
sentment. Bicameralism forces a potential faction to capture both Houses of Congress simultane-
ously. Presentment gives the president-the politically accountable entity least susceptible to
capture by factions-a voice in the legislative process.").
45. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison) ('[A] senate, as a second branch of
the legislative assembly, distinct from and dividing the power with a first,... doubles the secu-
rity to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or
perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient."); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (deeming it "far less probable, that culpable views of
any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the
same object, than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them"). For a
somewhat later view, see 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 555 ('It is far less easy to deceive, or corrupt, or persuade two bodies into a
course, subversive of the general good, than it is one; especially if the elements, of which they are
composed, are essentially different").
Presentment advances a similar purpose. The veto, Hamilton thus explained, "establishes a
salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects
of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body." THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton); see also
STORY, supra, § 882 C'[The [veto] power is important, as an additional security against the en-
actment of rash, immature, and improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legisla-
tive body, calculated to preserve the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, un-
constitutional legislation, and temporary excitements, as well as political hostility.") (citation
omitted). The veto may serve as a particularly effective check on factions, in part, because the
President is elected by a national constituency. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (The Presidents
participation in the legislative process was.., to protect the whole people from improvident
laws."); cf Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1927) (noting that "the President elected by
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
If interpretive practice (whether judicially fashioned or leg-
islative codified) enables legislators to vote for a statute without
taking direct responsibility for potentially authoritative legislative
history, the result detracts from the constitutional interest in con-
trolling factions. If a given policy is controversial, or if the costs of
agreement are high,46 the enacting coalition in each House may be
content to shift policy details to a subset of that body's most in-
tensely interested members.47 For instance, if most legislators want
credit for enacting environmental legislation, but do not want re-
sponsibility for its potentially costly specifics, they can leave the
details of that legislation to committees whose constituencies are
most interested in the policy outcomes. Given the skewed composi-
tion of most committees,48 effectively channeling law-elaboration
authority to them can institutionalize permanent factional logroll-
ing; the Agriculture Committee will have a disproportionate say in
elaborating the details of farm policy, but will yield like authority
over financial markets to members of the Banking Committee.49
Although this circumstance surely counts as a "practical" conse-
quence of separating the legislator's responsibility from the legisla-
tive result, it is a practical consequence that the process of bicam-
eralism and presentment was designed to address and to restrain so
far as practicable.
all the people is rather more representative of them all than are the members of either body of
the Legislature whose constituencies are local and not countrywide").
46. Increasing the precision and transparency of statutory norms brings value conflicts to
the foreground, and increases the costs of reaching agreement. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73 (1983).
47. This shift would lower the costs of agreement by reducing the number and diversity of
legislators who would have to assent. See Edward P. Schwartz et al, A Positive Theory of Legis-
lative Intent, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 54-55 (1994):
While the generation of supplementary legislative materials is costly, it is not nearly so
costly as writing more specific statutes. In addition to the time and manpower neces-
sary to produce the statutory language, it must be agreed upon by the Congress, a pro-
cess that becomes more precarious as legislation becomes more specific.
48. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 42 (1991) ('Committee membership rarely represents a cross-section
of the legislature. Instead, legislators tend to self-select into those committees in which their
supporters have the greatest stakes."); Morris P. Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative
Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 49 n.22 (1986) (noting
that committee reports are "prepared by the unrepresentative members and their staffs").
49. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 365,
383-84 (1990).
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III. CONCLUSION
In the end, Professor Siegel's Interpretation of Statutes Act
cannot change a crucial reality. Like a statute itself, legislative his-
tory is a text. As a text, it either adds to or subtracts from the
meaning of the enacted text; otherwise, courts would not bother to
consult it. By Professor Siegel's own account, the legislative history
is available when Congress votes for the statute itself; thus, it can
be adopted expressly or incorporated by reference each time Con-
gress passes a specific statute. If Members of Congress do not ex-
plicitly choose to do so, that fact is significant-constitutionally
significant, I would insist. Such specific incorporation would make
legislators directly responsible for the contents of the legislative
history, and it would compel them to decide which parts of the leg-
islative history they wish to incorporate-and which parts they
wish to exclude. A statute instructing courts to give such history
decisive effect, without insisting upon direct and specific legislative
assent, allows legislators to avoid the difficulties associated with
that choice. In so doing, it effectively permits Congress to generate
binding statutory details through a process other than bicameral-
ism and presentment. That outcome, whether sanctioned by judicial
practice or legislative direction, amounts to a self-delegation of leg-
islative power, the very practice generally condemned by the
Court's modern cases.
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